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Abstract
The categorization of populations as black is an emerging policy 
tool in democracies concerned with multiculturalism and social 
cohesion. Under the paradigm of the fight against discriminations, 
policies have been designed in order to mitigate inequalities 
pervasive in race relations, thereby raising the question of how the 
Blacks, who have been constructed as a subordinate category in 
social representations and practices, may be specifically targeted by 
public action. France and Colombia here display very contrastive 
landscapes: while Colombia has adopted a multicultural constitution 
in the 1990s and publicly acknowledges ethnic minorities, France still 
very much operates within a Republican color-blind framework and 
uses territorial or socio-economic angles to target ethnic minorities. 
However, both countries offer a surprisingly similar situation vis-à-
vis the positioning of the Blacks at the center of political discourses 
on cultural diversity and its issues, even though the difficulty to 
provide a univocal definition of Blackness relates to specific historical 
patterns of colonization and migration in each country. Both France 
and Colombia also tend to frame policies targeting the Blacks in terms 
of citizenship, often claiming to facilitate the inclusion of otherwise 
excluded groups in the demos.
Key words: Multiculturalism, Agonistic Democracy, Colombia, 
France, Blacks, Republic.
Resumen
La denominación “población negra” puede verse como una 
herramienta de los discursos políticos emergente en las democracias 
que se ocupan de la multiculturalidad y la cohesión social. Bajo 
el paradigma de la lucha contra las discriminaciones, se han ido 
diseñando políticas públicas con el fin de mitigar las profundas 
desigualdades fundadas en causas raciales, elevando así la cuestión 
de cómo los Negros, que han sido históricamente vistos y tratados 
como una categoría subordinada en las representaciones y prácticas 
sociales, pueden ser objeto de estas políticas públicas por parte del 
Estado. Francia y Colombia muestran paisajes muy contrastados 
con respecto a este tema: mientras que Colombia se ha adopto una 
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constitución multicultural en la década de 1990 y se reconoce públicamente 
las minorías étnicas, en Francia sigue operando un discurso republicano que 
se muestra ciego a la idea de incluir el color de la piel como un elemento de 
análisis social (daltonismo republicano) y utiliza ángulos territoriales o 
socioeconómicos para abordar el tema de las minorías étnicas. No obstante lo 
anterior, ambos países ofrecen una situación sorprendentemente similar con 
respecto al posicionamiento de los negros en el centro de los discursos políticos 
sobre la diversidad cultural y sus problemas. Así, pese a la dificultad de ofrecer 
una definición unívoca de lo que significa “ser Negro”, en los dos países, esta 
cuestión se relaciona con los patrones históricos específicos de la colonización y 
la migración en cada país. Tanto Francia como Colombia tienden a enmarcar las 
políticas dirigidas a las poblaciones negras en términos de ciudadanía, buscando 
como objetivo primero la inclusión de los grupos excluidos de del demos.
Palabras clave: Multiculturalismo, Democracia agonística, Colombia, Francia, 
Negros, República.
Introduction
The categorization of populations as black is an emerging policy tool 
in democracies concerned with multiculturalism and social cohesion. 
Under the paradigm of the fight against discriminations, policies have 
been designed in order to mitigate inequalities pervasive in race relations, 
thereby raising the question of how the Blacks, who have been constructed 
as a subordinate category in social representations and practices, may be 
specifically targeted by public action. France and Colombia here display 
very contrastive landscapes and in fact may appear to be opposite cases 
with regards to the accommodation of ethnic/racial minorities1, the first 
often considered to be operating within an “universalist” institutional 
1 We do not subscribe to any essentialist definition of race, or ethnicity but treat them as catego-
ries of social representations and practices. Race and racial characteristics are born in situation 
of interactions, therefore they are not fixed once and for all on a given individual. Race as a ca-
tegory is commonplace in Colombian discourses yet is banned from French public discourses, 
where it is replaced by the euphemized notion of ethnicity. Our denomination race/ethnicity 
has been constructed so as to render visible the processes by which racial categorization beco-
mes politicized and enters the realm of dominant public discourses.
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framework while the latter has been increasingly equated with 
“multiculturalism” —both of these terms have entered public debates and 
have come to bear meanings rather distant from their conceptualization 
within social sciences. Actually, while Colombia has adopted an avowedly 
multicultural constitution in the 1990s and publicly acknowledges ethnic 
minorities in order to try and solve issues pertaining to socio-economic 
inequalities between groups, France still very much operates within a 
Republican color-blind framework and uses territorial or socio-economic 
angles to target ethnic minorities. Yet both these representations need to 
be complicated. While France seems to be the model case for universalist, 
color-blind Republicanism ever since the French Revolution, it has been 
demonstrated that racial politics were not absent from the formation of 
the nation-state and, correlatively, of “national identity” (Noiriel 2007). 
Colombia has been one of the first Latin American countries to include 
pluriculturality as an historical and cultural national patrimony. This 
shift, from a monocultural Nation-State (with a republican and Jacobin 
vision of the Nation), towards a multicultural one, has taken place with 
the Constitutional change in 1991. From this moment on, Black people, 
historically invisibilized, acquire the “right” to a political, social and 
cultural existence.
However, both countries offer a surprisingly similar situation vis-
à-vis the positioning of the Blacks at the center of contemporary political 
discourses on cultural diversity and its issues, even though the difficulty 
to provide a univocal definition of Blackness relates to specific historical 
patterns of colonization and migration in each country. Both France and 
Colombia also tend to frame policies targeting the Blacks in terms of 
citizenship, often claiming to facilitate the inclusion of otherwise excluded 
groups in the demos —especially when in fact issues of redistribution 
are concerned. The history of Black people in both countries, like in 
many countries of immigration, is one of displacement, domination 
and subordination— but also of agency. In France, it is related to a 
centuries-old history of slave trade, colonization and migration, which, 
as we will see, are largely present in public debates. Yet one may argue 
that the current situation of Black people in France in fact conflates two 
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different histories: one of long-term colonization and incorporation 
within the French nation-state in the Antilles and one of post-colonial 
migration from Africa after World War II. This conflation gives birth 
to many ambiguities in discourses dealing with Black people, even if it 
has repeatedly denounced by scholars discussing the “Black question” 
(Durpaire 2006). 
Despite the recent official tendency to portray France as a country 
of immigration since the XIX century with a long history of incorporating 
immigrants and their children within its institutions such as the National 
Education System, it has been argued that until the 1970s France ignored 
itself as a country of immigration (Noiriel 1988). Since World War II, 
France has encouraged and relaxed its national borders at different times, 
primarily in response to its changing economic and demographic need. 
In the 1950s and the 1960s, most of the people who emigrated to France 
came from South Europe —Spain, Portugal, Italy— to work in French 
firms which lacked workforce. From the mid 1960s on, a new wave of 
immigrants came from the former French colonies of Northern and Sub-
Saharan Africa, later of Asia. Black African migrants were incorporated 
in a Fordist mode production after World War II when they helped 
sustaining France’s then booming manufacturing system, where they filled 
low-paying jobs. In 1974, the ban on immigration modified radically the 
socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants. Like other unqualified 
migrants, they were struck by the ban on legal immigration after the oil 
shock, and by new provisions for family reunification. Because family 
reunion was one of the few ways left to immigrate in France, the migrant 
population became increasingly female and younger, when the families 
of former “migrant workers” came to join them to live in France. Also 
the countries of origin became increasingly diverse and distant (Thierry 
and Rogers, op. cit.), with a rise in Asian immigrants (INSEE 1994). 
Black Africans, even though they represent a minority of immigrants, 
tend to be over-publicized in public discourses and are often described 
as irregular migrants or as taking advantage of lax family reunification 
policies. The turn towards a “knowledge-based society” during the 
current globalization era has further segmented the labor market, leaving 
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its ethnic nature untouched: labor markets are ethnically and sexually 
segmented. Yet much of the current debates on “African migrants”, as 
we will see, deal with black French people of migrant descent whose 
integration is described as problematic. Despite the long-term existence 
of a Black minority in France, many issues described as parts of the “Black 
question” are in fact characteristic of migration, thereby indicating that, 
like many other non-whites in France, the Blacks are increasingly framed 
as aliens and unwelcome newcomers. 
In Colombia, the history of Black people is also associated with 
a history of slave trade and colonization. The history of slavery, and 
particularly the moral and social wounds caused to Black people, have 
been the topic of many debates which have led to the recognition of Black 
people as social actors (as well as the Indians and Criollos) of the history 
of this country. During the last 20 years, academic, legal and political 
as well as civil mobilizations revealed the evolution of this population: 
passing from official slavery (XVII–XX century) to the abolition of 
slavery (1851).  However, the abolition didn’t erase institutional and social 
racism (to a large extent interiorized by the Blacks). However, despite 
the fact that the Black has been recognized by the law as a citizen after 
the abolition of slavery, s/he remained socially subordinate (Munera, 
1998).  Yet from the late XIX century on, the Black individual -born in 
Colombian territory or not- has been seen by the politicians of the time 
(Los Liberales), as a citizen. Later on, since the 30s, the communist left 
wing presented the Blacks (like the Indians) as people oppressed for 
social and economical reasons, far from the social-racial concerns that 
had structured the Nation-States throughout the American continent, 
and despite the relationship —still very often asymmetrical— with the 
other social racial components of the country (Whites–mestizos) in the 
first part of the XX century.
In the 60s and the 80s, the Africanist and Pan Africanist discourses, 
with the concept of negrology (Césaire, Fanon, etc.), among others, 
stemming from the Caribbean islands and the USA, circulated and 
generated a growing awareness that raised much interest among various 
anthropologists (N. Fridemann). Starting from this moment slowly 
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emerged the thinking that condemns the exclusion of the Blacks in 
education, politics and culture. However, civil society associations did 
not start their mobilization as fast as their academic “partners”, since they 
were divided by diverging perceptions of “negritude” in a mixed country. 
This situation would change starting from the 1991 Constitution and the 
law 70 of 1993 (part 1). These dates mark the beginning of the progressive 
politicization of black identity, a process that until now has reached its 
“state-led institutionalization” by the means of Affirmative Action policies 
(strongly inspired by the North-American experience) and the programs 
of promotion and defense of the “Afrodescendance” (ethno-education, 
national celebrations for Afro-Colombian heritage, for the abolition of 
slavery, etc.), becoming an important element for national politics and 
bilateral politics with the United States. Even if this “top-down” approach 
to the incorporation of ethnic relations on the political agenda is present 
in both countries, we shall see that Black people have developed a 
political agency throughout their history and seized available political 
opportunities.
In both countries, we find that issues related to a “Black problem” are 
increasingly present in the public sphere. Such problems differ according 
to the local situation of Black people and are framed in terms varying 
according to the countries’ histories, yet they address the same situation 
of measurable inequality, especially in socio-economic terms. While it 
should not be inferred that all inequalities from which Black people suffer 
in both countries are to be explained solely in class terms, but display 
multifaceted situations of intersectionality, socio-economic issues appear 
to be at the forefront of debate regarding them. Yet we are immediately 
confronted with the paradox that if evidence of a “Black question” is 
often of socio-economic nature, its discussion has taken an increasingly 
cultural tone in both countries, which public policies aimed at alleviating 
this situation tend to address through the angle of citizenship practices. 
Today, discussions of the civic integration of ethno-racial minorities are 
caught up in what appears to be an unsolvable ambiguity: on the one hand, 
minorities are seen as threats to the community (either of a cultural or of 
a political nature); yet their participation in the political system is seen as 
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evidence of its excellent functioning. The Blacks are therefore considered 
both as a problem and as a solution for both democratic systems, and 
their political participation both a necessary improvement in order to 
solve key issues in both societies and an achievement demonstrating 
their intrinsic qualities.
Our paper will focus on the politicization of Black issues in both 
countries: we will examine how the development of public policies aimed 
at tackling the “Black question” has allowed for a development of Black 
political actors that is actors mobilizing and intervening in the political 
sphere as Black. We argue that examining the definition of citizenship 
explicitly or implicitly contained in these public policies and discourses is 
essential to understanding the current politicization of Black identities in 
both countries. Actually, the paradigm of inclusion refers to a notion of 
citizenship in which it is seen as an element of social cohesion, not as the 
exercise of political rights in a pluralist and contested public sphere. We 
will demonstrate that policies aimed at mitigating discriminations against 
Black people and their socio-cultural integration end up co-opting so-
called representatives of Black minorities into the policy process while 
marginalizing political actors critical of government policies. This in turn 
radicalizes the positions held by marginalized Black political movements 
or public intellectuals: they are silenced either by a dominant paradigm 
refusing to acknowledge the specificity of Black experiences in the French 
case or by other hegemonic political actors in the field of race relations, 
such as indigenous movements, in the Colombian case. These processes 
may be analyzed using the concept of the “ethnicization of race” which 
refers to the construction of racial characteristics borne by individuals 
as ethnicized elements likely to be politically mobilized. While racial 
characteristics here refer to the multifaceted and fluid construction of 
identities in a pluralist context, for us the ethnicization of race corresponds 
to the increased fixity of traits associated with race in order to frame 
them in political discourses and public policies. Using Mouffe’s concept 
of “agonistic democracy”, we will show that the construction of Blackness 
as a political category is intrinsically contentious and therefore leads to 
a heightening of interracial social tensions. However, such dissent, the 
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mark of a truly democratic process, is repressed in both countries to 
avoid an ethnicization of political discontent – but it ironically re-appears 
in the form of opportunities seized by a variety of political actors, in a 
context in which ethnicity becomes a key dimension of politics.
1. Black identities at the top of the media and 
political agenda in both countries
1.1. In Colombia: debates regarding the implementation of  
affirmative action policies
A mini-debate about affirmative action policies in favor of “Afro-
Colombian” people has been going on in Colombia for the last few months. 
Two events triggered this debate: first, the claims of a young woman who 
said she had not received a scholarship for “Afro-Carthaginians” because 
she was not “black enough”; then the assault of a young “Afro” woman a 
few days later. Unfortunately, the issue these cases raised, albeit relayed 
by local and national newspaper, did not receive the attention it deserves 
in the political, social and academic life of Colombia.
The first case started with a letter of “denunciation” published by 
Mrs. Amor (a social worker) in Cartagena’s local newspaper, El Universal, 
in which she reported having been ranked second in the selection process 
for the admission to a Master’s Programme in Development and Culture, 
and said she had not received the scholarship for these studies because, 
according to her, she was not “really, really” Black. Clearly, Ms. Amor 
accused the organizers of this process of not selecting her as a recipient 
of the grant for Afro-Colombians because she was “not Black enough” 
(Amor, 2011).
The organizers of the selection process for the admission to the 
Master’s program and the award of the scholarship responded by saying 
that the reason for which the scholarship had not been awarded to Ms. 
Amor was that she did not meet one of the criteria, namely the situation of 
“social and economic vulnerability” (Amor belongs to an “average” social 
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stratum). Although the fact that Ms. Amor is “Afro” was not questioned, 
she was not in a situation of economic vulnerability. In contrast, the other 
two candidates met this condition. Consequently, Martha Amor could 
register for the Master’s program, thanks to her academic qualifications, 
but did not qualify for the scholarship.
In the second case, Yeni Castro, an Afro-Carthaginian woman, had 
been the victim, in Cartagena, of an assault (with air rifle shots) while 
she was out with some friends. The assailants were middle-class white 
young men and women. Ms. Castro was shot with rubber bullets, to the 
cries of “dale dale a la negra ... ... tiro al blanco (...) inmunda negra te 
dio”. This event provoked the indignation of many intellectuals of the city, 
surprised by the banality with which the media treated this serious and 
deplorable event.
The local echo was, here again, followed by a regional and national 
echo. A few days after the event, Ms. Castro’s assault was reported in 
regional and national newspapers. Once again, articles in favor of and 
against affirmative action policies were published, criticizing on the one 
hand the excessive use of the racial component in the discourse of the 
Latin American left (such as Morales and Chavez), and denouncing on 
the other hand the drift to „racial and religious hatred imported from 
Europe and the United States (Cfr. Abad 2011 and López Hernández 
2011).
The ethnicization of race through the construction of an “Afro” 
identity
The implementation of affirmative action policies has immediately 
been seen as a major political act aiming at remedying an inexcusable 
omission of the State of Colombia: the “invisibility” of the ethnic identity 
of indigenous groups and of Black people in Colombia and the damages 
that this “gesture” had caused to these two sectors of the population, by 
ignoring them and turning them into objects of social, cultural, political 
and economic inequalities.
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This mea culpa began in 1991 with the new Constitution (CPC-
91), which states in its article 7 that the “State recognizes and protects 
the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Colombian nation”. This new 
situation means to indigenists the “reward” of a long history of seeking 
acceptance of Indigenous culture as an heritage, part of national identity, 
and provides for the first time, to the advocates of a Black identity, a 
transitional article in the Constitution (Article 55), stating that “Black 
communities that have come to occupy uncultivated land in rural areas 
bordering the rivers of the Pacific Basin [...]” should be respected in their 
cultural traditions. Through this transitional section (converted into Law 
70, July 27, 1993), Black people, as an ethnic and cultural component, 
officially entered in the order of political and institutional representations 
of the Colombian nation. The new CPC-91, strongly influenced by 
political theories of multiculturalism, provides the legal instruments 
to promote the materialization of ethnic and cultural diversity, such as 
the recognition of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, as a 
collective subject, i.e. a subject that benefits from rights granted to the 
community as a unit, beyond the (individual) subjects that constitute it.
Law 70 of August 27, 1993 provides specifically the Black 
communities with the right to collective ownership of the territories 
they occupy (Act 70, 1993. article.4 Chapter III, 7), the protection of the 
economic activities they undertake and that provide for their subsistence 
(Act 70, 1993. Chapter VII, Article 47), the right to be consulted on 
the measures that may affect the right to exploit forest resources on 
their territories (Act 70, 1993. Chapter IV Art. 20, 23, 24). It calls to 
the inalienable right to an education specifically oriented by the ethno-
historic particularity of the Black population, including, in the body of 
the Law, mechanisms to protect the “Afro” cultural identity in Colombia 
(Law 70, 1993. Chapter VI, Section 32, 44). In the political sphere the law 
happens to suggest that “In accordance with the Article 176 of the National 
Constitution, we establish the special circumscription to elect two (2) 
members of Black communities, thereby ensuring their participation in 
the House of Representatives “[Act 70, 1993. Chapter VIII, Section 66]. It 
establishes, in addition, the creation “in the Ministry of Government, of 
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the Department of Black Community Affairs with a seat in the Council 
of Economic and Social Policy” [Act 70, 1993. Chapter VIII, Section 67].
Following the creation of all these instruments, a mobilization 
began to organize and implement a broad representation of the Black 
population of the country. Yet the problem caused by the reductionism in 
the definition of Black communities in Law 70 arose quickly, given that it 
confines them to a geographic area (Pacific Rim) and to traditions within 
the country-city relationship (Wade 1993, Cunin 2003, Hoffmann 2000).
Indeed, a large part of the Colombian Black population is scattered 
in urban centers and/or lives in the Caribbean coast of the Atlantic and 
in some cases, such as Cartagena, is integrated into the urban dynamics 
that go back the time of the colony (XVIIIth and XIXth century) and the 
formation of the republic (formation of the nation-state starting from 
1811). In these cases, the people, their lifestyles and socio-historical 
experiences, do not correspond to those described by Law 70.
In this situation, it was thus necessary either to extend the features 
of the category of “Black community” offered by the law, or to create a new 
categorization, more inclusive, that would not lose sight of the dynamic 
and fluid nature of this identity. The second option was chosen. Thus, 
the mobilization for the recognition of a Colombian Black identity in the 
cities of the country was carried out through a process of ethnicization of 
the Black race, giving way to the more inclusive acceptance of the Afro” 
category. If cultural elements did not serve as the basis for affirmative 
action policies anymore, racialized elements took their place which were 
then ethnicized, that is attached to cultural traits supposedly characteristic 
of the newly extended “Afro” category.
From this moment on, we can say that the defense and promotion 
of Black identity in Colombia laid on two components:
1. On the one hand, there are the black communities of the Pacific, 
which correspond to the definition established by Law 70. They 
benefit directly from all the legal measures mentioned above.
2. On the other hand, there are people who are not located in that 
specific geographic area and can not “show” their participation to a 
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traditional way of life, and therefore had to create “Afro” associations: 
nonprofit organizations, with statutes and a legal personality, self-
defined as consisting of “Afro-Colombians” women and men. 
These associations receive approval from the Directorate of Black, 
Afrocolombians, Raizales and Palenqueras Communities Affairs, 
within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, at the national level, 
and possibly the corresponding Consultative Commission for 
Black Communities that accredits them to present themselves to 
programs and projects of assistance or cooperation provided by 
the state or international agencies, targetted at, respectively, “Afro-
Colombian” or Afrolatin populations. These associations, in turn, 
certify the condition of “Afro” of an individual, when he requires it 
to participate in grants or affirmative action programs.
Afrocolombian associations, in turn, make use of the ethnicization 
of race device. In the Columbian case, we mean by ethnicization 
of race a process that occurs when, in spaces of complex identities 
(interlinked or superposed, as in this case), takes place a shift of some 
of the symbolic characteristics (rituals, dance, music, etc..) which 
were initially (historically) related to (a) specific group (s) enrolled in 
a spatial-historical process of racializing socialization, a situation that 
led to their real marginalization, forcing them to strategies of resistance 
that entail retaining some symbolic features (Black people of the Pacific, 
descendants of slaves). These features are then attributed to a wider social 
group that has actually been of great cultural significance despite a heavy 
history of exclusion. Urban Black people in Columbia have seen, during 
this historical process, their survival mechanisms against the dominant 
culture imply a major real and symbolic acculturation in the twentieth 
century. Through mass audiovisual culture and the cultural industry of 
the late XXth century, this acculturation has contributed to generating a 
supranational and transnational culture (Carvalho 2005: 11).
This ethnicization of race process had already begun with Law 70 
of 1993 - through the definition of “black communities” of the Pacific, 
assimilating them to an indigenous community (Gros, 2000: 80), but 
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reached its greatest extent of refinement with the inclusion of the term 
“Afro”. This term, “borrowed” from the African-American studies, has 
the double virtue of allowing, on the one hand, the inclusion of a large 
proportion of the Black people of Colombia, or self-defined as such, 
although they do not match the requirements of Law 70. On the other 
hand, it becomes a bastion of a “new” culture, mobile and preformative, 
around which one hopes to consolidate a collective identity (black), so 
that it would be assumed and claimed by the actual or potential members 
of the Colombian black ethnic minority. To achieve this, the term “Afro” 
should be carrying a collective project (cultural, political, lifestyle, etc., 
that will give unity and direction to the process of building this collective 
cultural identity called afrocolombianity.
While the term “Afro” was adopted relatively easily and has 
penetrated the legal, associative and academic jargons, making itself 
self-evident and in many cases used as a synonymous of black people 
(when it refers to a group) or Black / Negro man / woman (when it refers 
to an individual), it can also be ambiguous and cause discomfort. It is 
ambiguous because both the institutions in charge of implementing 
affirmative action policies and afro activists themselves use this term to 
refer to someone with a black phenotype or who grew up in a culture of 
African descent. Porosity between the racial category Black and the ethnic 
notion Afro causes discomfort, because the ethnicization of race process, 
implicit in Afrocolombianity, may be perceived as forced and unfair by 
those who do not consider as obvious the relationship between the ethnic 
category “Afro” and the race category “Black”.
This is the position of part of the Colombian population, among 
them many Whites of course, but also the entire population who cannot 
or does not want to belong to the ethnic category “Afro”, escaping it by 
falling into the category of mestizo, and therefore cannot benefit from 
affirmative action programs proposed by local governments and the 
national government; so, they feel forgotten by the State and its welfare 
policies and vulnerable. Such is the case of the people we call historical 
poor.
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1.2. In France: framing a “Black issue” in a universal context
The current discussion of an “African problem” in France and 
educational failure2
Discourses on immigrants constructed through and in the media over 
the past dozen years in France have clearly singled out children of North 
African origin as the most prone to involvement in acts of violence, 
delinquency or drug-related behavior, not to mention school drop-out, 
truancy, and disciplinary action, and more recently gang rape. Such 
negative stereotyping now seems to have transferred to Black youth of 
Sub-Saharan origin, whose failure in the school system is often blamed 
on their parents’ polygamy practices. This negative media coverage 
significantly contributes to their continued stigmatization, exclusion and 
vulnerability to discrimination. In many societal spheres, and increasingly 
in the media, explanations for the low educational attainment of migrants 
that are linked to their cultural background are often quoted, such as 
the size of migrant families, or their “unwillingness” to integrate. Black 
African migrants are here at the forefront of such stereotypes, since they 
are deemed to have too many children and to relinquish their educational 
duties.
In fact, the demographic changes affecting immigration flows have 
had a strong impact on migrant children or children with a migrant 
background, who were increasingly numerous in the French education 
system, since migrant children have the same rights and obligations 
to attend school than French ones, no matter their legal status. At the 
beginning of the 90s, foreign children accounted for 9.4 % of all children 
in elementary school in France, compared to 7.7 % in the mid-70s. The 
rise in the rate of foreign children at school until the mid-80s resulted 
from the policy of family reunion. Almost the totality of foreign children 
attend public schools: immigrant families tend to have a smaller income; 
2 This part draws from the results of a research project carried out in collaboration with Elise 
Féron, which compared the French and Danish situations with regards to discrimination in 
educational policies (Beauzamy and Féron 2011).
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besides, adaptation classes for children who do not speak French well are 
for most part opened in public schools. Concerning children of migrants, 
the French school is highly open to them insofar as equal opportunities 
remain the rule. As a consequence, the French schooling system is, in 
principle, indifferent to differences, and puts forth an ideology of equality 
and secularism deemed to help creating citizens while ensuring a steadily 
rising level of education for everyone. This model has however been 
widely criticized following the seminal critique made by Bourdieu and 
Passeron (1970), which shed light on how the schooling system, by giving 
in the reproduction of the “culture bourgeoisie”, de facto discriminated 
against children of low-income families. This led to a growing awareness 
of the discrimination against children of migrants for the past twenty 
years. But despite these critics and numerous educational reforms to 
improve the overall achievement of pupils, assessment procedures in 
the educational system have not changed much: they still unwillingly 
favour French native pupils. Besides Bourdieu’s and Passeron’s interest 
for the mechanisms of elite reproduction, there has been a growing 
concern for underperforming kids: numerous debates pertaining to the 
problematic evaluation of public schools indicate an ongoing concern for 
“school failure” (échec scolaire), a situation in which pupils are many years 
behind schedule and exit schools without any diploma. Policies targeting 
underperformance were then designed following the same ideological 
basis as the array of social policies assembled under the umbrella 
denomination of “politique de la ville” (urban policy).
This challenge of underperforming pupils has been met by 
policy choices mirroring how the problem was conceptualized: here an 
explanation based on social class has dominated public discourses, yet has 
increasingly left way to “cultural” explanations based on ethnic belonging 
and ethnicity. Initially, school failure has been addressed by displaying 
additional resources to schools located in poor neighbourhoods instead 
of addressing the specific difficulties met by children of migrant origin 
in the French public school system. Today, educational inequalities 
related to language acquisition, socio-economic disadvantage and 
discrimination, and the problems these pose for the learner, the class, 
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the educators and the schooling system, continue to be addressed within 
these broadly-defined blanket policies. This may in part be attributed 
to the ideological premises upon which National Education in France 
was founded – uniform (universal), equal and secular education for all 
children - and the concurrent denial or repression of any and all references 
to differential treatment, be it in the interest of eradicating discrimination 
or inequalities, on the basis of ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ or ‘national’ 
origins. In the 1980s, the Ministry of National education has adopted 
a policy of positive discrimination in favour of priority areas, in order 
to reduce the impact of social inequality on educational achievement. 
Educational Priority Areas (ZEP) were created in 1981 for the benefit of 
all pupils —schooled in primary, junior high and senior (mainstream and 
vocational) high schools— living in socio-economically and culturally 
disadvantaged environments. Schools zoned as priority education areas 
are allotted additional staff, teaching and financial resources, intended to 
reinforce existing educational activities and facilitate the implementation 
of innovative locally-based initiatives.
Later educational policies continue to define priority education in 
terms of target sites where the population is most at risk for schooling 
difficulties, failure or dropout, as well as violence, deviance and 
delinquency. Many of the schools which fall within priority education 
areas or networks cater to an overly high proportion of immigrant children 
and French children of immigrant descent, many of them Black (Lagrange 
2010) : in fact, the high proportion of pupils of migrant origin has become 
a popular proxy for other factors – from school underperformance to 
insecurity. Paradoxically, however, the failure to recognise the “minority” 
status of these populations, while simultaneously deploying educational 
resources to improve their schooling outcomes, means that individuals 
continue to be exposed to implicit forms of discrimination (segregation, 
ethnicization and stigmatisation) that interact with educational outcomes 
without these factors being taken into account in official policy.
The Republican injunction regarding the provision for differential 
treatment on the basis of ‘ethnic’ or other origins meant that the policy 
had to be formulated in general terms – as addressing the educational 
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needs or difficulties of all children whose disadvantaged social, economic 
or ‘cultural’ situation hinders their achievement or integration within 
the schooling system. Yet the French schooling system is today faced 
with having to address the increased ethnicization of the difficulties 
associated with schooling migrants and children of migrants and 
the implications that this has for school relations (among teachers 
and pupils, teachers and parents, pupils of different ‘ethnic’ origins) 
and discrimination in education (segregation, orientation practices). 
Ethnicity is not only a salient element of pupils’ identities —although in 
complex and multifaceted ways at odds with popular representations of 
black or Muslim separatism—, it is also a prevalent element of public 
debates concerning schools and how to improve their performances. The 
increased politicization of ethnic identities within schools and in public 
discourse creates a double-bind for educators and policy makers who 
cannot respond effectively to these issues without compromising on the 
basic principles of equal, secular Republican education. The Republican 
taboo on ethnic, religious, or cultural origins blinds the schooling system 
to an ever-widening gap between the principles underpinning National 
Education —equality, tolerance, non-discrimination on the basis of 
group differences— and the ordinary practices which take place daily 
within its ‘jurisdiction’. Moreover, this taboo prevents the institution and 
its professionals from conceptualizing and addressing the question of 
discrimination as it takes place in education and within the school. 
Blame it on African cultures – or Black subculture?
Yet it does not limit the multiplication of discourses claiming to unveil 
this taboo issue or to point at the “state of denial” in which French 
policymakers are concerning migrants’ issues, including educational 
underperformance and high crime rate. Such is the case of the latest 
book by sociologist Hugues Lagrange, Le Déni des cultures —the 
denial of cultures (2010). In this hotly debated essay, Lagrange focuses 
his analysis on the underperformance of Black pupils at school, and 
examines explanations for this state of affairs. His core thesis is that 
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cultural explanations have been rejected in favor of politically correct 
color-blind socio-economic approaches which have failed. However, far 
from obfuscating the uncomfortable truth as Lagrange implies it, studies 
on immigrants in Europe have already demonstrated that pupils and 
students with a migrant background tend to underperform in France 
(Wihtol de Wenden 1999). Several indicators show it: foreign students 
are clearly overrepresented in adaptation classes for people who do not 
finish the first cycle of high school and are oriented in professional classes 
and vocational training. In the second cycle of high school, they are 
also more likely to attend professional classes than general or technical 
classes. Foreigners living in France tend to have far fewer diplomas than 
French people: in 1990, 60 % of all foreigners declared that they did not 
have any diploma, compared to only 27 % of French citizens by birth. 
Immigrants fare generally worse as compared to native pupils because 
most of them belong to low-educated and low-income families. If these 
facts are publicized, the explanations given to them by most political 
actors —politicians and policymakers, but also NGOs and public 
intellectuals— however deny that the migrant origin of pupils might be 
at fault. Lagrange chooses exactly the opposite strategy, and goes as far 
as to borrow from American theses related to the “culture of poverty” 
responsible for the enduring underperformance and hyper criminality 
observable within the African-American community. Such theses claim 
that the majority society is not to be blamed for blatant racial inequalities, 
which are caused by the adherence by African-Americans themselves 
to cultural traits at odds with the dominant culture: factors related to 
family structure are put forth – especially the enduring thesis blaming 
the supposedly matriarchal structure of Black families in which divorce 
rates are skyrocketing. Lagrange however notices that most children of 
Black African origin do not live in “broken homes”, even if their family 
structure clearly differs from the dominant French one, with more 
children, stronger inter-generational ties, sometimes particular —and 
illegal in France— forms of patriarchal structures such as polygamy. Yet 
despite these blatant differences, he imports debates on the “culture of 
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poverty” in the French context where they resonate well with discourses 
blaming youth “banlieue” subcultures.
Indeed polygamy has been at the center of many debates regarding 
African migrants and is a much-used angle used to categorize them in a 
pejorative fashion. While experts on polygamy practices stress out the fact 
that it is a situated practice concerning only a small minority of migrants, 
polygamy has become a generic rhetorical tool in order to vilify African 
migrants as a group. It is connected in public discourses to an array of 
issues to which it is supposedly —and wrongly— a key element, such as 
social provision fraud, patriarchal domination and the decline in fathers’ 
authorities. Polygamy has been blamed, for instance, for contributing 
to the eruption of the major riots of 2005 (Beauzamy and Naves 2006). 
Besides recycling traditional racist frames blaming the hyperfertility of 
groups “taking over” the endangered nation, polygamy as a theme has 
managed to bring together issues at the center of public discourses on 
migrants: seemingly feminist frames insisting of female victimization 
meet with conservative anti-youth ones, critiques of a lax Welfare state 
meet with law-and-order discourses blaming immigrants as factors for 
rising criminality and illegality. Because of the Republican disregard for 
ethnic, religious, or cultural distinctions, official discourses mainly put 
forward socio-economic factors in order to explain the low educational 
attainment of migrants and children of migrants. When migrant cultures 
are evoked, it is in their utmost ‘traditional’ and anti-modern aspects 
such as polygamy. 
In discourses on polygamy, the characterization of the culprits 
varies from ethnological denominations (Soninké vs. Peul for instance) 
which remain very abstract for the general non-African public, 
metaphorical denominations abundant in Lagrange’s essay (“peoples of 
the forest” which strongly echo the Columbian official characterization of 
Black people), vague geographical denominations (sub-Saharan or even 
African). Denominations evoking localities often serve as metonymies for 
Black people in general – for instance Lagrange, who warns us against the 
overgeneralization of cultural traits specific to certain African peoples to 
the whole group of African migrants, let alone Antilleans (p.166), often 
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derivates from localized ethnological observations to generalized claims 
about African migration. Many critiques of Lagrange have pointed at the 
danger of forcing a simplified ethnological approach of African peoples 
on Black French: claiming that they are French indeed is not denying 
cultural specificities deriving from their migrant background, but 
acknowledging that they have been profoundly reshaped by migration 
itself. Black French are therefore not African, even when they tend to 
identify in relation to their country or people of origin. Besides the 
obvious confusion between African and Antillean Blacks, which is so 
often denounced that it has become a topos of discourses on Black people, 
national, religious and class origins also help differentiating between 
various Black African identities. Yet we argue that this confusion is not 
a natural byproduct of the commonplace ignorance of African cultures, 
but a result of discourses framing the Black as impersonators of various 
social and cultural problems. It is an indication of an ongoing process of 
the ethnicization of race in which “Black culture” as a construct becomes 
the bearer of a number of fixed —and often pejorative— traits3.
Discourses on education are therefore a good place to look at in 
order to understand why Black immigrants and children of immigrants 
have been recently framed as a problem. Changes in the explanations 
to migrant pupils’ underperformances reveal the composite nature of 
integration policies as well as more general trends regarding the treatment 
of “visible minorities” in the public sphere. Socio-economic analyses have 
consistently pointed at the need for more resources for social policies, 
especially in areas where disadvantaged pupils are concentrated. Yet, 
arguments putting forward practices of discrimination have contributed 
to the critique of this color-blind argument and asked that educational 
institutions examine their own bias —intended or not— towards migrant 
pupils or non-white pupils. The recent prevalence of a paradigm of 
Otherism has led to an increasing tendency to blame migrant cultures 
for these issues: the ethno-racial (and gendered) categorization of pupils 
3 The provocative title of the much discussed essay by Gaston Kelman, Je suis noir et je n’aime 
pas le manioc (I am Black but I don’t like manioc)(2003) evokes this process by which racial 
categorization –Black– becomes equated with cultural traits which are forced upon individuals.
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between the “integrated” and the “disintegrated” constructs this latter 
category of hopeless troublemakers. Cultural explanations help reify 
these categories since they assign an immovable ethnic identity which 
supposedly entirely defines behaviors and attitudes: although they have 
not yet found their ways into public policies, they dominate discourses 
and help undermining anti-discrimination actions since they clear the 
majority society from accusations of unequal treatment. 
2. The politicization of Black identities
2.1. In Colombia: identity politics and the formation of “Afro- 
Colombianity”
Public policies: the politicization of cultural identity
•	 Pandora´s box
Legal and regulatory settings (CPC-91, Ley 70/1993, T-422/1996, Conpes 
3310/2004) consolidate the politicization of the Colombian black cultural 
identity. Indeed, from these legal tools organizations and representatives 
of Pacific black communities and “Afro” groups in the country are going to 
promote cultural, social and economic demands, in support of the black 
population.
Examples are given by affirmative action policies for the “afro” 
people that have been implemented by way of public policies in several 
areas of the country, including programs such as “Employment in Action”, 
“Youth in Action” “Families in Action, “ “Paths to Peace”, “Humanitarian 
Assistance”, “Human Rights”, “Transparency and Violence” and “Field in 
Action, among others. “
These programs are targeted at Colombians in general, but the 
Constitutional Court ruled in the sentence of the case 1410, 2000 that, 
in terms of access to limited goods —namely those for which demand 
exceeds supply—, “(...) in such cases it cannot be based on the assumption 
that all individuals, without distinction, are entitled to the limited good, 
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which makes it necessary to make its award based on reasonable criteria 
(...).”Thus, in its application, are a priority “Afro-Colombian people that 
are at extreme levels of poverty and discrimination and live in major 
cities, that it to say, the population [of African descent] living outside 
the Pacific Basin”. We can see that a sort of “Affirmative Action” policy is 
practiced indirectly, that, legally speaking, is not intended to contribute 
to the construction of a cultural / ethnic Afrocolombian specificity, but 
seeks to identify and promote the access of any citizen or Black people, 
discriminated and vulnerable, to state-led social programs to improve 
their living conditions.
Despite the regulations, as happened in the U.S., “Affirmative 
Action” here has ended up becoming a theoretical and political argument 
that involves racial and ethnic components that justify the fact that every 
“Afro” feels, due to his condition of African descent (meaning a descendant 
of slaves carrying a set of traditions that originate in these populations 
“imported” as goods from the XVIIth century) with the legitimate 
right to request priority and request redress from the Colombian State 
historically driven by Whites , creoles and mestizos.
•	 To rescue and to train
Take a specific case to see affirmative action policies in favor of Afro 
“movements”, such as the ethno-education which implies the setting up 
of chairs of Afro-Colombianity in the context of programs for primary 
and secondary schools (in public and private); it should not be limited 
to the areas of greatest concentration of these populations, but should be 
part of school curricula in order to achieve the main goal of contributing 
to interethnic and intercultural dialogue, and respect for difference.
The extensive actual case law (provided via Constitutional rulings) 
has contributed the discussion and helped to politicize the Black subject 
as “Afro”. The success in the “propagation” of the political effects of this 
phenomenon of massive case law, allows us to affirm that the major 
cities of Colombia (Bogotá, Cali, Medellin, Barranquilla and Cartagena) 
now have a chair of Afro-Colombianity and a Commission for Black 
communities. In these cities there are also “affirmative action” policies 
BRIGITTE BEAUZAMY  – ANGÉLICA MONTES MONTOYA
64
Perspectivas Internacionales
that clearly establish a quota system and differential treatment (in all 
areas: health, children, gender, education, culture, sports, etc.) for Afro-
Colombian populations as ethnic groups. In this sense, there has been an 
evolution on constitutional jurisprudence.
We are again facing the politicization of the “Afro” subject, by 
the means of the use of the vocabulary of Afro-Colombianity which has 
become a positive way to address Black issues. Around this speech of 
Afro-Colombianity, it has been built a civil society that identifies itself with 
its ethnic “Afro” belonging, and it has been strengthened to ensure their 
discursive autonomy with respect to indigenous organizations, their first 
allies. So, they ceased to be represented and defended by the Indigenous 
representatives during the Constituent Assembly (1991) to become true 
mobilizers of public opinion through the work of civil society activists, 
which are organized, and they converse with each other and with other 
groups, for example, the LGBT movement, the Affirmative Caribbean 
collective associates with Afrodescents Cabildo (Gavilaneo) and all of 
them holding that each other share their status as victims of social and 
political exclusion practices. 
The scope of “Afro” associations is broad: these range from simple 
neighborhood organizations to political parties that regroup association 
members to become unavoidable political forces at all levels (local, 
departmental, regional and national). In some cases, the associations 
and the parties engage in transnational cooperation partnerships with 
Afro-American movements in the US, and the style of modern political 
negotiations, carry out lobbying in the U.S. Congress: such is the case 
for example of the Association of Black Communities Process (PCN) 
which has close ties of cooperation with human rights organizations like 
WOLA, Global Rights, an association of displaced Afro-Colombians USA 
(AFRODES USA), Afro-Colombian leaders living in the Metropolitan 
area in Washington, D.C., as well as certain congressmen. For example, 
in 2007, they met to discuss national and international politics affaires 
like human rights violation affecting people of African descent, related 
to the impact of Plan Colombia and the fumigations of coca plantations. 
In addition, national and local events organized to celebrate 2011 as the 
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International Year of the African-descendants (65va UN Plenary Session 
in December 2009) and supported by the authorities and state institutions.
This situation means that the traditional parties and the government 
take into account the Afro-Colombian communities as political actors 
and potential partners in national electoral contests and bilateral relations. 
An example of this, is the creation of the Steering Committee under the 
Plan of Action on Racial and Ethnic Equality signed on January 12, 2010 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia (Jaime Bermudez) and the 
Vice-Secretary of State of the USA (James Steinberg) representing their 
respective governments. This does not mean that before 1991 there were 
no political alliances with black elites, because, as explained Agudelo 
(2005), in areas of high concentration of black population, as the Pacific, 
there has been a Black elite since the XIXth century that maintained 
negotiations with the traditional political parties, particularly with the 
Liberal Party. The author devotes the fourth chapter of his book to this 
aspect, using the word patronage to explain that the elite has participated 
in political action in the region “understood this [political action] as 
a strategy of competition between groups “ (Agudelo, 2005: 101); this 
means that the Black elite itself consciously participated in the fight for 
the conquest or the preservation of local political power, a fight that takes 
place through “political actors collectively organized in political parties 
or movements”  (Agudelo, 2005: 101). 
As we can see, the norm and the political discourse on the norm, 
which contributes to creating an ‘Afro ideology’, are two distinct issues. 
What we mean by this is not only the notion of a discourse that has a 
purely geographical sense (‘Afro’ implicitly refers to a historical and 
territorial origin: Africa) but also a discourse of ethnic identity, which 
gives it a historical (via the transatlantic slave trade), juridical (via the 
CPC-1), political and socio-cultural legitimacy, through the reality of 
social and material exclusion (Zizek, 2003:4).
Thus, it is common nowadays to speak about an Afro Colombianity 
or of an Afro Colombian ethnic identity, a notion often used in political 
circles, as well as social sciences and organizations. The shift from a 
geographical meaning to an ethnical, racial, political and juridical sense, 
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has occurred softly and silently, trough – as Althusser would say – the use of 
ideological, ritual and institutional practices: for example the expressions 
of ‘afro’ folk traditions. Such expressions have been promoted from the 
top, by the state, channeled through cultural institutions. And before 
becoming the expression of the interiority of the pre-existing reality of 
the Black historical condition, these expressions have contributed to (re)
creating this Afro Colombianity, which means that the latter accounts for 
the mechanisms that have generated it. With regards to the institutional 
side, public policies and the set up of specific political entities (such as 
the “Afro Issues Bureaus” (“oficinas de atención a la población afro”) are 
telling examples.
Our goal here is not to denounce the existence of this ‘Afro 
ideology’ as inappropriate, but to show how the ambiguous usage (and 
over usage) of the above mentioned categories generate tensions, that we 
name ‘conflicts’, which should be overcome by the legislator’s norm (when 
he refers to Colombia as a multi-cultural and multi-religious country, in 
1991), whereas he tends to fear to have to be confronted to the agonistic 
aspect of democracy.
2.2. In France: debates on post-colonialism and racism open 
up the possibility for Black mobilizations
New debates on racism and discriminations and the racialization of 
debates
The French conception of racism has long been limited to intentional 
racism, and not to contextual, institutional or symbolic racism. Anti-
racist mobilizations from the 1980s such as the “Marche des Beurs” 
(March of the Arabs) or SOS-Racisme put forth slogans insisting that 
France was a multi-colored, hybridized society: “Black Blanc Beur” 
(Black, White, Arab) addressed this call for fruitful coexistence in a 
positive and playful way. These mobilizations were mostly concerned 
with the risks they perceived in the rise of the radical right and more 
specifically its institutionalized wing, the Front National party, which 
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scored its first electoral breakthroughs at the same moment. Later, the 
diffusion of radical right discourses in the media and the progressive 
appropriation of some of its features by other actors (Beauzamy and Naves 
2010) led to new concerns regarding this xenophobic turn of political 
discourses. While this concern for the increasing acceptability of racist 
discourses in the public sphere is still very much topical, it is no longer 
at the heart of debates concerning racism in France. In fact, attention 
has come to focus more on racist mundane actions rather than solely on 
racist political discourses and their translation in racist hate crimes by 
neo-nazis. When Michel Wieviorka directed the research project which 
led to the publication of La France raciste (“Racist France”) in 1992, it 
uncovered – to the dismay of many commentators – the fact that the 
French Republican model of equality and non-discrimination based on 
the public disregard for race and ethnicity was in fact not working. A new 
theme arose, which pointed at the disillusion of young French people 
from migrant origin for whom the promises made by French institutions 
—such as meritocracy at school— were not kept, because institutions 
such as the police were themselves concerned with prejudices they were 
not addressing. La France raciste also opened up the Pandora’s Box of 
addressing the existence of racist attitudes and actions perpetuated 
everyday by people who could not be easily categorized as fascist, such 
as recruiters or landlords, and contributed to the turn of debates from 
discussing racist hatred to everyday racism and institutional racism. 
Almost ten years before the transcription of the EU “Race” directive, it 
opened a debate which would then be framed in terms of discrimination. 
It is commonplace to notice that the Europeanization process has 
led to a turn from “anti-racism” to “the fight against racial discrimination” 
in public policies tackling such questions since the late 1990s. The 
transcription of European directive 2000/43 of June 29th 2000, which 
defined “discrimination” in a comprehensive fashion in article 6, indeed 
put a lot of emphasis on uncovering unequal treatment in many situations 
where it was not necessarily accompanied or backed up by racist 
discourses. This turn was celebrated and in fact fuelled by anti-racist civil 
society organizations which were quick to propose new tools to measure 
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discriminations such as “testing”, a practice which helped uncover 
racist practices by provoking them. This focus on the measurement of 
discriminations, especially when they result from institutional designs 
and rules and do not involve the active agency of a racist actor, led to a 
focus of the debates on the problematic legality of “race statistics”. While 
the many political and legal aspects of this question do not concern us 
here, one ought to notice that in order for statistics to be used to address 
racist prejudice or unequal treatment, they are to construct categories 
which will more or less correspond to the commonplace categorization 
as “Black”4. If some scientific and political discourses emphasize the role 
played by African cultures in explaining inequalities as we have seen, 
here “Black” is clearly defined as a category of social representations and 
practices with seldom any “cultural” content. 
While this debate on the measurement of discrimination has led to 
fruitful discussions of how ethnicity manifests itself in social interactions, 
and especially in power relations, it has not been enthusiastically 
adopted by all people concerned with the implementation of anti-
discrimination policies. For instance, civil servants tend to underestimate 
racial discrimination in public institutions and rely on the Republican 
egalitarian framework to deny that they might help reproducing 
unequal treatments. As a matter of fact, they too often consider that 
immigrants are simply not enough integrated, even when alleged victims 
of discrimination are indeed French citizens. Racism and discrimination 
are still very much intertwined in public discourses and many actors do 
not differentiate between them, which seems at odds with the repressive 
focus of anti-discrimination policies placing judicial courts at the center 
of the dispositive. Lastly, the focus on discrimination instead of racism 
has been suspected to fit into a multiculturalist agenda, which is deemed 
by anti-communitarians to give way to the birth of “ethnic quotas” and 
“race ghettos”, Anglo Saxon countries being a negative mirror (Durpaire, 
op. cit.). 
4 Although the difficulties of linking an actual phenotypical appearance to this category have 
been noticed, for instance in the French context by N’Daye (2005).
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While racism and discrimination are legally punishable crimes 
which have been addressed by a variety of public policies as well as civil 
society initiatives, the suspicion that the underperformance of Black 
people can be explained because of their own cultural traits justify 
why it could be legitimate to avoid them in certain circumstances. A 
recent scandal exemplified this issue: a meeting between high-ranking 
football federation executives was secretly recorded while they openly 
discussed putting unofficial anti-Black quotas into place for the selection 
in the national soccer team. They claimed that winning teams such as 
the Spanish one had no problem with their few Black players. When 
the conversation was publicized, it created a large turmoil, even though 
officials were quick to dismiss any rumors that legal action be conducted 
against the culprits. Despite the blatantly racist nature of the recorded 
conversation, many commentators openly asked whether it should really 
be treated as discrimination: in fact, they (and the football federation 
representative) claimed that what they had meant was that bi-national 
players were problematic because they were likely to opt for their other, 
African, nationality at the time of the selection. This shift from Black 
to African/alien was a good indication that anti-immigrant discourses 
have gained much credit in contemporary France, where they can openly 
be displayed in a variety of situations, even when illegal; and that the 
categorization of Africans as “Black” (in English) is characteristic of 
the current ethnicization and indeed racialization of anti-immigrant 
stances. As we will see, while Black political actors are often blamed for 
this ethnicization of the French political sphere, their mobilizations in 
fact fit into this racialized frame in which issues affecting the Black are 
increasingly addressed.
Is racism against Black people a specific form of “Negrophobia”?
n parallel to contemporary debates on racism in France and the fight 
against discriminations, doubts have increasingly been voiced pertaining 
to the universal angle of such policies which aim at tackling all forms 
of prejudice. While proponents of the specificity of anti-Semitism have 
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insisted for its specific mention in legal texts such as the Gayssot law of 
1990 prohibiting “racist, anti-Semitic or xenophobic public discourses”, 
other argue for the necessity to distinguish anti-Muslim prejudice or 
Islamophobia, and also prejudice against Black people or Negrophobia. 
These new categories are somewhat of a puzzle in the French context 
since they address prejudices which are already prohibited under the 
umbrella of laws and policies fighting against racism and discrimination. 
Therefore their added value may be questioned, since they seldom aim 
at extending provisions against unknown forms xenophobic discourses. 
Islamophobia as a rising theme of debates regarding racism in France is 
mostly concerned with prejudices present in public policies and political 
discourses, especially around key issues of headscarf and minarets. It 
allows for the denunciation of racist prejudices hidden behind claims of 
secularism and republicanism. 
Negrophobia, for its part, is mostly related to the public discussion 
of the French colonial past and of contemporary post-colonial Franco-
African relations. As in the case of Islamophobia, what is addressed is not 
the everyday, mundane prejudice against Black people, but the treatment 
of Black history in public discourses and policies. The emergence of 
such category is in fact related to the increasing acknowledgement of 
the role performed by the French state in slavery and colonization: the 
Taubira law of 2001 acknowledged that slave trade was a form of crime 
against humanity and led to the creation of public commemorations of 
the memory and history of slavery. Far from ending debates regarding 
the history of slavery by transforming it into a matter of consensual, 
official commemoration, diverging voices managed to put an opposite 
view of Franco-African history on the political agenda. In 2005, the 23rd 
February law on the acknowledgement of repatriated French (French 
citizens who were displaced back to the metropolis after the end of 
colonization, especially from Algeria) stipulated that the nation was 
thankful to repatriated French citizens for their actions in the colonies 
and proposed that the “positive role” of colonization be taught at school. 
This occasioned a large turmoil, particularly among historians who in a 
petition denounced the political uses of their discipline, but also among 
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Black political actors, as we shall see. The discussion of Negrophobia 
was also revived by debates surrounding the infamous “Dakar speech” 
pronounced by President Sarkozy in 2007, in which he claimed that “The 
African man (sic) has not yet entered history”. Many academics pointed 
at the gross oversimplification of his views on African history and several 
essays were published in order to correct them (see for instance Chrétien 
2008, Mbem 2008, Konaré 2009). Negrophobia is therefore a category 
constructed to shed light on the specific form of Otherism performed 
against Black people, in which colonialism plays a key part: it is closely 
related to the perpetuation of post-colonial frames to interpret African 
situations and the colonial content of French-African relations. For 
instance Diop et al. pointed in their 2005 essay at the role played by the 
media in circulating stereotypes and false information on “Black” Africa.
As in the case of Islamophobia, defining Negrophobia a sub-category 
of xenophobia does not lead to a general questioning of the prevalence of 
racist attitudes and practices in France, but to the emergence of political 
cleavages opposing actors promoting diverging views of French history, 
institutions and society. Durpaire identifies in the group which he labels 
“anticommunitarians” extreme Republicans5 for whom the increased 
denunciation of anti-Muslim or anti-Black racism is undermining 
institutions by undermining their legitimacy and by asking a preferential 
treatment for people labeled as victims: since, as we have seen, both 
proponents of the categories of Islamophobia and Negrophobia have 
centered their criticisms on public policies and official discourses, anti-
communitarians might not be completely wrong about the fact that 
Islamophobia and Negrophobia were constructed to denounce racism 
contained in public institutions. Yet, interestingly, defenders of Republican 
institutions may also situate their claims within a general denunciation of 
xenophobia: such is the case of discourses protesting against the specific 
5 We should be wary of not attributing the content of the contemporary Republican ideology 
to actors labeled as such, mostly by themselves. The turn of Republicanism from an ideology 
shaping institutions to a political identity should not obfuscate that many actors labeled as 
“communitarians” by self-avowed Republicans in fact adhere to most aspects of Republicanism, 
such as the fact that openness to migrants who want to become French citizens and the equal 
treatment of all should be the guiding principles of the French Republic.
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anti-Semitism of Black people, which has led to cross accusations of 
“Black anti-Semitism” and “Jewish Negrophobia”. Alain Finkielkraut, 
a radical Zionist public intellectual, has for instance strongly criticized 
advocates of “Creolization” as anti-Semitic: “there are people from whom 
we hear a lot constantly like Edouard Glissant, Patrick Chamoiseau, 
Raphaël Conflant. These ideologues of Creolity (…) I however fear that 
creolity might also be used to fuel not only the hatred of colonial France, 
but also the hatred of Israel, the Jewish state if you wish, that is a non-
creole State, not hybridized”6. Here the conceptualization of Israel as a 
colonial state —a frame much used by pro-Palestinian activists but here 
appropriated by a Zionist speaker— is used in order to delegitimize 
creolity understood as a Black theory of race relations, even though it 
promotes the positive aspects of hybridity. Similarly, some Jewish public 
intellectuals have appropriated denunciations of anti-white racism 
characteristic of the radical right in order to point at the danger posited 
by Black youth for law and order. Finkielkraut again, in a much quoted 
interview given to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, described the 2005 riots 
as “anti-Republican pogroms” and emphasized the presence of black youth 
among rioters7. He also criticized the overwhelming presence of Black 
players in the national soccer team, a theme which ironically escaped 
the space of public discourses to settle in professional soccer discourses 
as we saw. Denouncing racial prejudice and xenophobia is therefore a 
rhetorical tool likely to be appropriated by a large array of actors, some 
of them political adversaries. The consensus in public discourses on the 
need to tackle xenophobia —overtly racist discourses being in any case 
6 Extract from a radio show led by Elizabeth Schemla on Radio Shalom, 6 mars 2005, quoted 
on the “news website of the Francophone Black community” grioo.com. He was reacting to 
the aggression four days before in the Antilles of Black comic and radical anti-Zionist activist 
Dieudonné by three extremist French Jewish youth.
7  Such discussions of a possible antagonism between Jews and Blacks has led concerned ac-
tivists to the creation in 2004 of the Amitié Judéo-Noire (Jewish Black Friendship). Yet it did 
not manage to put an end to the ethnicization of tensions between both groups. The creation 
by radical Black supremacist Kemi Seba of a movement called “Tribu Ka” was accompanied 
by a much publicized action in which a few dozens of activists shouted anti-Semitic insults to 
storekeepers in the heart of the historical Jewish neighbourhood of rue des Rosiers in2006.
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illegal— does not prevent from conflict to arise within this very realm of 
discourses and policies. 
The French discussion of anti-Black racism or Negrophobia is 
therefore connected to public debates on French history but more 
deeply to a criticism of the political appropriation of institutions dealing 
with Black issues by political actors deeply opposed to any form of 
multiculturalism. Sometimes under the banner of Republicanism, 
they oppose what they see as dangerous and insidious communitarian 
politics operating under covert multiculturalism (especially when quotas 
and discrimination are discussed) and putting forth undue claims for 
recognition and compensation. Yet two elements particular to the French 
configuration of this discussion of Negrophobia should be noted: firstly, 
they tend to address issues of creolization and hybridity as intrinsically 
positive and therefore do not point to any “pure” Black essence —as we 
will see, Black supremacists are a tiny minority of Black political actors. 
In this way, they fit perfectly within the dominant French discourse in 
which hybridity and métissage are key elements of harmonious social 
cohesion in a situation characterized by cultural diversity. Secondly, 
Negrophobia as a theme emerges while the Black are increasingly placed 
at the center of discourses on race relations and inequalities, as we have 
seen, which is a relatively new situation in a country which has repeatedly 
singled out the Arabs as its main Other. The Black may here emerge as a 
secondary category of Otherism. 
Black mobilizations and the politicization of ethnicity
François Durpaire, in his seminal study of French Black mobilizations 
(2006), examines how claims related to the memory of slavery were turned 
into public policies institutionalizing the commemoration of slavery, in a 
context where Black political actors multiplied their interventions in the 
public space on this theme. He notices that as soon as 1998, a collective, 
le Comité Devoir de Mémoire (Duty of Memory Committee - CDM), 
mobilized in relation to the commemoration of the 100th year anniversary 
of the abolition of slavery. The main topic for mobilization concerned the 
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light under which slavery and its abolition would be officially portrayed: 
the collective was especially critical of the failure to represent the 
resistance of slaves and their agency in their own liberation, in favor of 
a version of history in which freedom was granted to them by a benign 
French government. This first collective was followed the year later by 
another one, the Comité Marche du 23 mai (March of May 23rd Committee 
- CMM) which mobilized on the same theme —the name refers to a key 
date in slave revolt for freedom— but with a slightly different angle: 
where CDM was aiming at changing official discourses and institutions, 
CMM was concerned with reinforcing solidarity between Antillean slave 
descendants thanks to this shared memory of slavery considered to be 
the symbolic ground founding Antillean societies. As we saw, the Taubira 
law of 2001 was a marked shift in the official commemoration of slavery 
inasmuch as it officially associated civil society organizations deemed 
to represent the interest of slave descendants to the institutionalization 
of history and memory. It took the form of the creation of a Comité 
pour la mémoire de l’esclavage (Committee for the Memory of Slavery 
– CPMHE) composed of public intellectuals (including Durpaire). That 
all these organizations, public or private, used the same denomination of 
“committee” is an indication that such mobilization was elite-based and 
aimed at a quick institutionalization. Further debates occurred within 
and outside CPMHE around the date to be chosen for the official national 
commemoration of slavery and its end: once again a cleavage formed 
between the proponents of a version of the history of slavery privileging 
the laudable governmental decision to put an end to slavery and those 
putting forth the glory of slave revolts. It led to a further fragmentation 
of (mostly Antillean) political actors mobilized on this theme with the 
creation of the Coordination Nationale des Associations et Personnalités 
Antillaises et Réunionnaises (National Coordination of Antillean and 
Reunion an Associations and Public Figures – CNAPAR). The mention 
in the name of associations along with public figures, as well as Reunion 
an, indicated that the group aimed at widening its scope.
A key element to these mobilizations is the place they give to the 
category “Black” in their discourses. Some Antillean mobilizations such 
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as the Collective DOM (DOM Collective named after the Départements 
d’Outre-Mer, Overseas Departments) insist on the specificity of the 
treatment of Antillean territories and populations and opt for a 
geographic instead of racialized definition of their constituency: actually, 
for them Antilleans are not Black but mixed-race or Creole. No mention 
of Africans is made since they, as migrants, are not concerned by the 
specific problematic of the Outre-Mer. Similarly, a vast ensemble of 
African associations and NGOs cater to specific constituencies, often on 
a national basis but which may deal with more general political issues, 
like the Association Malienne des Expulsés (Malian Association of the 
Expelled) which protests against the deportation of irregular migrants, 
often in collaboration with other associations such as the Tunisian Citoyens 
des Deux Rives (Citizens From Both Banks). African NGOs may either 
address aspects of migrants’ lives in France —such as cultural ones— or 
propose transnational mobilizations on African issues. For instance, the 
Association Afrique Avenir (Africa’s Future Association - AAA) puts forth 
a very general claim that it is “a space for exchanges and actions in favor 
of populations of African origin in France and in Europe”: yet it mainly 
focuses on issues related to HIV prevention. In this case again, no interest 
is given to the “Black” dimension of the mobilization in a French context: 
if Black people only are represented on the website, one may also notice 
that they are generally female, a choice with matches the focus on HIV 
prevention and family. The “Black” dimension is not an intrinsic quality 
of the mobilizations of people whose racial category is Black: if it is not 
a salient dimension of the mobilization —like in the case of AAA— or if 
political actors actively refute that a “Black” identity be attached to them 
—like in the case of Antillean Creoles—, the label shall not be used in the 
mobilization. Other categories closer to the identity construction of the 
participants may be preferred. 
Black mobilizations incorporate in their ideologies the idea 
that race, and more specifically its growing ethnicization, creates the 
conditions for a growing parallelism in the experiences of Antillean and 
Africans — who together form the vast majority of French Black or Black 
residents. Therefore a first major angle of Black political discourses is 
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their focus on racism, since racists operate this very simplification and 
generalization of identity which ends up creating a “Black” identity. The 
Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires (Representative Council of 
Black Associations – CRAN) is the first major organization claiming a 
Black identity in order to address issues of inequalities. Its name closely 
mimics the one of the major Jewish community civil society umbrella 
organization, the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France 
(Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions - CRIF), which has 
played a key role in publicizing and defending the interests of French Jews 
since the 1950s, and the CRAN, like the CRIF, holds an annual dinner with 
civil society representatives, politicians and public figures. The CRAN 
was deemed to be a dangerously communitarian initiative by Republican 
opponents —when Malian, Tunisian, or Jewish initiatives were not—, yet, 
as Durpaire aptly remarks, the accusation of communitarianism is hardly 
suited for an initiative bringing together people actually belonging to 
different communities. As he notices (p.221), this posture actually entails 
that frictions between Antilleans and Africans be silenced. Far from 
advocating separatism from the French state or the majority society, the 
CRAN borrows much of the universalism characteristic of the dominant 
institutional discourse, yet it critiques its current application: no true 
universalism is possible if the French Republic is unable to treat all its 
citizens equally and to address its deep-rooted inequalities.
Racism, in the French context, is often addressed using a post–colonial 
frame put forth by such political organization as the Parti des Indigènes 
de la République (Party of the Republic’s Indigenous People – PIR), 
whose name directly refers to colonial categorizations and frame. Post-
colonialism places the emphasis on the memory and commemoration of 
colonization and its end, but ties the common past to the present day by 
arguing that contemporary forms of exclusion, subalternity and racism 
actually reproduce colonial schemes which have been incorporated in 
institutions and have insufficiently been uprooted after the decolonization 
process. It also opens up the possibility to forge a common experience 
between all people victimized by post-colonial or neo-colonial policies and 
practices. Yet the specificity of Black experience is here missing (the PIR 
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is not a Black organization and for instance includes many Maghrebans). 
Framing Black experiences for political purposes has therefore proved 
to be a difficult process, even if Black political actors have managed it: 
forged in a shared history of colonization and/or slavery, it can however 
rely on this element only and political discourses expand to incorporate a 
theory of contemporary ethnic relations in France. In such process, they 
encounter the opposition of anti-multiculturalist Republicans, but also 
other minorities whom —such as the Jews— may be perceived both as a 
model for a successful challenge to universal, color-blind institutions and 
as competitors.
3. Agonistic democracy and the construction of 
« Blackness » as a political category
In this last part, we shall turn to the more theoretical discussion of how 
the concept of agonistic democracy may help us understand the current 
politicization of Black identities in both countries and explore the 
democratic potential of Black mobilizations.
3.1. Agonistic democracy and the centrality of conflict for the 
political
The work of Chantal Mouffe will enable us to re-think the situation of 
tension which is caused by the existence of cultural plurality, and more 
generally, of any collective identity, within democratic and republican 
Nation-States. In her book En torno a lo político (2007), the author 
explains what the thinking of the agonistic democracy’s dimension 
consists in. According to Mouffe, to understand  democracy in terms 
of agonism implies that one overcomes, on the one hand, the model of 
the unsolvable confrontation of the friend / foe equation as described by 
Schmitt (1932), who believes that a society driven by political liberalism 
is a society in which the individual is at the centre, and the fundamental 
referent, above any collectivity; in this context, any collective identity 
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is denied, which according to Schmitt unveils the limit of any rational 
consensus and the dead-end of politics. On the other hand, Mouffe does 
not believe in the relevance of a blind praise of the new deliberative 
liberal political paradigm (Habermas, Rawls, Arendt) which advocates 
the rational solution to every conflict (caused by individuals’ antagonistic 
interests) through rational and reasonable dialogue, as if every conflict 
could unarguably be resolved and as if every society could be “pacified” 
thanks to it (Benasayag / Rey, 2007: 14-17).
According to the author, in both cases there will always be a non-
impartial solution to conflicts: either through authority based on violence 
(real or symbolic) of the ones against the others (Schmitt), winners or 
losers, or through authority based on pervasive argumentation, the 
persuasion of the ones by the others; here again, the equation us – them 
ends up being favorable to the ones at the expense of the others.
Thus, Mouffe thinks it is important, to overcome this dead-end, to 
take into account an important aspect of the human being, which has been 
omitted  both by Schmitt’s antagonism paradigm and by the deliberative 
liberal political paradigm, namely “the collective identification”, affects and 
passions. Thus, she suggests we transform the enemy into an adversary 
(who would encapsulate the collective identification) and to put the 
agonistic aspect back at the centre of democracy, using this forgotten 
aspect of the liberal political tradition. This way, she tells us that in her 
agonistic vision of politics (and indirectly the agonistic democracy), there 
are adversaries who confront themselves “within a democratic framework, 
but this framework is not perceived as something inalterable: it can 
potentially be redefined through hegemonic fight”. Politics as agnosticism 
implies that one recognizes the contingency of “the hegemonic political 
and economic articulations which determine the specific configuration 
of a given society at a given time” (Mouffe 2007: 39-40).
Seemingly, according to the author, politics is necessarily linked to 
the actions of the hegemonic institutions, and in this sense, one must bear 
in mind the fact that we are frequently facing politics as hegemony. This 
point is very important as it expresses certain dimensions of social life, i. 
e. that the power’s institutionalized practices —which imply separation, 
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distinction and exclusion— must not be eluded from theoretical debates 
(both in the right and left wing) on democracy today.
We believe that, since Mouffe, one can see that conflict understood as 
tension between adversaries (who in order not to end up confronting each 
other necessarily look for the physical, moral or symbolical elimination 
of their opponent) has to take place within a democracy which promotes 
the agonistic aspect of politics, and that its existence does not cancel 
the regulatory and social peace-making power which the deliberative 
paradigm advocates. It rather has to do with the building-up of an us/
them that is compatible with democratic pluralism, which reminds us 
that democracy is not untouchable, given that it is not a completed 
project; this erroneous idea has ‘authorized’ the more optimistic analysts 
to say that we have reached the end of History in so much as we support a 
perfect model of politics. On the contrary, according to Mouffe, agonistic 
democracy must show us the ever perfectible aspect (or the permanent 
perfectibility) of democracy, and to re-think the stance of the left-wing 
today from that perspective, in order to bring a new dynamic to the left / 
right opposition in Europe and in Latin America.
Mouffe criticizes prominent theories of deliberative democracy 
(e.g. Rawls and Habermas) in order to show that they tend to exclude 
conflict from the public sphere and from the realm of politics. Therefore, 
dissent is acceptable to a certain level, but more profound disagreements 
—for instance those resting on matters seen as identity issues— cannot 
be negotiated within the boundaries of deliberative politics, because of 
this “fundamental tension between the logic of democracy and the logic 
of liberalism” (p.19). This debate cannot be closed, and therefore should 
be avoided.
3.2. Cultural diversity, the politicization of Black identity and 
hegemony
We think that the adversarial nature of the political theorized by Mouffe 
to understand the role of the left in a democratic context marked by 
the crumbling down of the Soviet system which made the hegemonic 
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advent of neoliberalism the only “reality” (Mouffe, 2007: 38) can be used 
to analyze the politicization of cultural and/or ethnic identities. For her, 
the “dimension of antagonism” in democracy stems from the “pluralism 
of values” (Mouffe 2005: 23). What we identify as objectivity in society 
is in fact the result of power relations. “This point of convergence —
or rather mutual collapse— between objectivity and power is what 
we meant by ‘hegemony’” (ibid.). Power is here seen as “constituting 
political identities”: which in our case helps us study how Black identity 
is constituted through relations of power in both countries. Clearly, we 
cannot consider pre-formed Black identities which would in a second 
moment become politicized, but rather observe how the politicization 
of race relations in both countries enables Black identities to become 
political. Black identities emerge, as we have seen, on the ground of other 
identities which it strives to incorporate. “Politics aims at the creation of 
unity in a context of conflict and diversity: it is always concerned with the 
creation of an ‘us’ by the determination of a ‘them’” (2005: 25). Therefore 
politics has to do with the determination of boundaries and the definition 
of identities, described as different from and alien to one another. Within 
the perspective of agonistic pluralism, the “them” is not constituted of 
enemies but of adversaries whom we want to defeat but whose right to 
express themselves is not disputed.
Revalorizing conflict as a normal and positive aspect of political 
life means that cultural and ethnic plurality should not be treated as facts 
that is in a way in which a consensus would be assumed and treated as 
the dominant paradigm, thereby preempting the possibility for political 
debate. Similarly, adversaries to multicultural policies should not be 
silenced as erroneous or as the bearers of an endemic racism characteristic 
of the kind of euro centrism in favor during the colonization era. Silencing 
the Other in such debates on multiculturalism —for instance when he or 
she dares questioning affirmative action measures for instance— while 
assuming the position of the defenders of the subaltern means denying 
the Other’s existence as a legitimate political actor. “Victory” is here 
impossible if it means suppressing the Other: in a functioning democracy, 
proponents and opponents to multiculturalism must face the enduring 
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and necessary existence of their adversary, or face the possibility of seeing 
democratic face-à-face replaced with downright violent conflict.
This leads us to a critical re-examination of policies aimed at 
promoting Black subjects. Following Mouffe’s critique of Schmitt, 
replacing the friend/fiend confrontation with a sacrosanct consensus is 
in fact not democratic: in our cases we saw that in Columbia it took the 
form of the official valorization of Afro-Colombianity, at the expense 
of addressing the complexity and multipositionnality of the Black, wh 
ile in France the traditional universal and color-blind anti-racism was 
increasingly mixed with policies aimed at the recognition of minorities 
through the problematic inclusion of their version of French history within 
the dominant discourse. While we do not make any claims regarding 
the intrinsic values of such important steps to tackle institutionalized 
forms of racism, we argue that these are hardly suited to acknowledge the 
agency of Black political actors. When, as we saw, mobilizations prepared 
and accompanied these turns of public policies, the official discourse 
tends to erase them and to treat new measures as evidence of society’s 
consensus around a progressive and benevolent state concerned with the 
fair treatment of the Black. Even when the problematic ethnicization of 
politics and of race categories themselves was addressed by Black political 
actors, the defense of the Black subject by progressive voices took the 
form of the denunciation of his/her invisibility, exclusion, subalternity, 
etc. Consequently, they denied the legitimacy of conflictive interactions 
within political debates on these questions, thereby silencing both the 
voices of the opponents to these policies and those of more radical Black 
actors putting forth other claims.
We argue that it is essential to open up a space for agonistic 
interaction within theoretical discourses and political debates on cultural 
diversity. Even if the creation of new policies and institutions defending 
and promoting Afro-descendants (in Colombia) or cultural diversity 
(in France) may be seen as a discursive victory of the subalterns and as 
a sign of their increasing political, social and symbolic recognition, in 
both countries we identify a systematic negation of actual or potential 
conflicts deriving from ethnic and cultural pluralism – either because of 
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a competition for scarce resources or because of the incompatibility of 
existing values. Therefore, striving at incorporating the historical Others 
into a larger but still hegemonic Us appears to be a dead end: the discourse 
on the need for a better recognition of Black people masks the fact that 
recognition, as an ideological tool, may be used in order to silence dissent 
and promote adhesion to conformity (Honneth 2006: 245-246), thereby 
reinforcing hegemony.
Conclusion
We think that the claims for Afrolatinity, Afrcolombianity, Afrocarthagenity 
(in Colombia), Negrology or the fight against Negrophobia (in France) fall 
into what could be called an intrinsic contradiction of racialized identity 
claims, in the sense that, far from escaping the conservative and binary 
vision of the oppressed – oppressor relationship, it reproduces this scheme 
of representation of relationships of domination that it intended to break. 
In spite of a shift in the discourse from the philogenesis of whiteness to 
a philogenesis of blackness, seen in its positive side under the concepts 
of “Afro” (Colombia) and “diversity” (France), once again both elements 
of the equation (White, Black) need each other to keep existing (there is 
no White without a Black and vice versa, there is no Negro/”Afro” freed 
from domination without a dominating White).
With this “gesture”, are we not participating in the perpetual return 
of the oppressed – oppressor equation? As if, by a strange Manichaeism, 
our spirit of solidarity would make us lose sight of the fact that the 
oppressed can negotiate with his oppressor or that he can, at the same 
time, be the oppressor of another oppressed. It creates an endless spiral 
of the logics of expansion of oppression through macropowers. For 
instance, in Colombia, in the XIXth century, a black elite emerged that 
was involved in the new government systems led by White Criollos (Helg, 
2000), and the XXth century offers many cases of negotiations between 
oppressors and oppressed – a good example is given by the patronage 
networks established by political parties (Agudelo, 2005; Restrepo, 2005). 
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A similar situation occurs in France where the Blacks from the Antilles 
islands, historically victims of a colonial history, have been “favoured” by 
the system of negotiation with the white government of the metropole 
in some cases such as annual leave schemes in public service, compared 
to other sectors of the national population (including people with North 
African of Sub-Saharan origins).   
If racialized identity claims contain an intrinsic contradiction, it 
has not prevented them to be increasingly placed at the centre of political 
debates in both countries. Black identities are shaped and mobilized 
to reinforce institutions through public policies aiming at addressing 
issues to which they are connected; yet designing new policies aimed 
at commemorating Black history or at a better redistribution not only 
preempts the possibility for more radical demands, they also contribute 
to tame the Black political subject they emphatically contribute to create 
by incorporating certain Black public intellectuals and politicians in 
institutions while rejecting the others as extremists and racists. Of course 
this does not prevent such political options for existing as the increasing 
publicization of racialized ideology opens a promising field for them: for 
instance, we argue that the choice made by French Black supremacist 
Kemi Seba to launch his Nation of Islam-inspired movement with an 
anti-Semitic direct action is a good example of such trend.
Certain key questions remain therefore open: how does the 
politicization of identity and the ethnicization of race affect the possibility 
for peaceful coexistence between communities? The existence of an 
“Afro-ideology” shaping public policies in Colombia and the enduring 
universalist claim of French institutions contribute to denying to conflict 
its status as a nodal aspect of the political. This fake suppression of conflict 
via the institutionalization of ethnicized identities does not lead to the 
expected social pacification and preempts the possibility for democratic 
debate on these themes, and identities are captured in the reproduction 
of the political sphere.
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